Challenges: Difference between revisions
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* Access control is often managed by senders, not by the mailbox owner. One of consequences is that if a spammer wants to send messages to someone it's enough to send a first message from some email address under his control, in order to confirm the captcha. | * Access control is often managed by senders, not by the mailbox owner. One of consequences is that if a spammer wants to send messages to someone it's enough to send a first message from some email address under his control, in order to confirm the captcha. | ||
* Message loss - many senders do not respond to challenges. | * Message loss - many senders do not respond to challenges. | ||
C/R systems invariably include the ability to whitelist correspondents manually, as a partial solution to message loss problems. |
Latest revision as of 08:11, 15 June 2009
Anti-spam technique: Challenges | |
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Date of first use: | 1990s |
Effectiveness: | Medium |
Popularity: | Low |
Difficulty of implementation: | Medium |
Where implemented: | MTA or MUA |
Harm: | High |
Challenges or Challenge/Response (C/R) attempts to validate unknown senders by replying to their mail with a challenge message. If the sender responds to the challenge in a way the C/R system approves of, the mail is delivered and the sender is whitelisted. The expected responses may be any return e-mail (typically to a coded address in the Reply-To: header), a return message with a particular key phrase, a clickthrough to a web page, or a clickthrough followed by solving a Captcha problem.
C/R systems are widely considered to be abusive and ineffective. Problems include:
- They generate backscatter harming innocents - most spam has forged sender addresses, so most challenges are sent to people who had nothing to do with the message being challenged.
- They don't work with messages sent by anything other than an individual human sender: newsletters, receipts and other transactional messages, and so forth.
- Recipients of challenges to forged mail often confirm them, since that's the easiest way to make the challenge spam go away.
- It can generate loops - if two poorly configured systems challenge each other's mail, an indefinite mail loop can result.
- Delays are introduced, which may be larger if the sender doesn't immediately receive the confirmation request or simply doesn't have access to network for some reason.
- Access control is often managed by senders, not by the mailbox owner. One of consequences is that if a spammer wants to send messages to someone it's enough to send a first message from some email address under his control, in order to confirm the captcha.
- Message loss - many senders do not respond to challenges.
C/R systems invariably include the ability to whitelist correspondents manually, as a partial solution to message loss problems.